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As has been pointed out by various writers, the history of
the evolution idea is not a brief one. Many thinkers—the
ancient Greeks, the early theologians, the eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century philosophers and biologists—have directed
their attention to the difficult and unsolved problem of the
origin and development of life, of society and of the universe.
As we trace through the history of thought, with the light
which science has given us, we observe that some of the great
thinkers who have wrestled with this problem of development
have made contributions of inestimable value in spite of their
meager scientific knowledge and inadequate observations;
others, due to the same limitations, submerged their more
valuable thoughts in a host of naive ideas; still others made no
advances but merely summarized and organized the ideas and
suggestions of those who preceded them. As Lucretius summed
up all the teachings of the non-Aristotelian philosophy, so
LeConte epitomized the major pre-twentieth-century ideas
concerning evolution. Let us, then, examine LeConte's idea
and see what there is in it of value.
In the first chapter of his book, Evolution*, which first
appeared in 1887, LeConte deals with the scope and definition
of evolution. In order to objectify his notions, he refers again
and again to the development of the egg as the type form of
all evolution.
Every one is familiar with the main facts connected with the develop-
ment of an egg. We all know that it begins as a microscopic germ-cell,
then grows into an egg, then organizes into a chick, and finally grows
into a cock; and that the whole process follows some general, well-
recognized law. Now, this process is evolution. It is more—it is the
type of all evolution. It is that from which we get our idea of evolution,
and without which there would be no such word. Whenever, and
*Joseph LeConte. Evolution, Its Nature, Its Evidences, and Its Relation to
Religious Thought, (Second Edition, Revised), 1899. New York: D. Appleton and
Company.
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wherever we find a process of change more or less resembling this, and
following laws similar to those determining the development of an egg,
we call it evolution.*
LeConte, like Spencer, says that evolution, as a process,
is not confined to the development of one thing, as the egg,
nor as a doctrine is it confined to one science, as biology, "The
process pervades the whole universe, and the doctrine concerns
alike every department of science—yes, every department of
human thought." All things may be studied from two points
of view. From the one view we are concerned with things as
they are; but from the other, with the process by which they
become what they are. "This 'law of becoming' ", says
LeConte, "in all things—this universal law of progressive
inter-connected change—may be called the law of continuity."
This law asserts that there is a universal causal relation between
things in time. "This is the universal law of evolution."
Thus evolution is a single process which unifies and binds to-
gether all things into a causal and temporal relationship.
Although LeConte does speak of evolution as being universal,
he seems to limit his discussion and thinking almost exclusively
to biological evolution. "If there be any evolution, par
excellence, it is evolution of the individual or embryonic develop-
ment."
Now that we have an idea of LeConte's general approach
to the problem of development, we are ready for the statement
of his definition which is as follows: "Evolution is (1) con-
tinuous progressive change, (2) according to certain laws, (3) and
by means of resident forces."] Since he takes embryonic
development as his type for all evolution, he assumes that
everyone will admit that his definition is completely realized
in this process of development. "The change here is certainly
continuously progressive; it is according to certain well
ascertained laws; it is by forces (vital forces) resident in the
egg itself." Since, then, this definition applies to the type
form, he concludes that it applies equally well to all things and
hence is a valid definition.
Since we are not satisfied with the mere statement of his
definition, let us analyze it carefully and see what he means
by each of the elements which it embraces. First, what does
*LeConte: Evolution, p. 3.
jLoc. cit., p. 8.
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LeConte mean by progressive change? We shall best under-
stand his meaning from his own statements. He discusses this
first element of his definition in three paragraphs and illustrates
his idea by the Ontogenetic series, the Taxomonic series, and
the Phylogenetic series. Of the first he says:
"Every individual animal body—say man's—has become what it
now is by a gradual process. Commencing as a microscopic spherule
of living but apparently unorganized protoplasm, it gradually added
cell to cell, tissue to tissue, organ to organ, and function to function;
thus becoming more and more complex in the mutual action of its
correlated parts, as it passed successively through the stages of germ,
egg, embryo, and infant to maturity. This ascending series of genetically
connected stages is called the embryonic or• Ontogenetic series."*
Similarly, he discusses the Taxonomic series and the Phylo-
genetic series, and in a sentence closes that section by saying:
" I t will be admitted, then, that we find progressive change in
organic forms throughout geologic times." Does this make
clear to us what "progressive change" is? It is true that in
the individual we have the stages of germ, egg, embryo, infant
and maturity. Also in examining the rock strata, we find
simpler forms of life in the lower levels and more complex in
the higher; but a mere statement of these facts does not explain
to us what progressive change is. What is meant by change
which is progressive? LeConte makes extensive use of the
analogy of the branching tree of life in which he represents
progressive change by the branches which go upward. Man-
ifestly to say that progressive change is change upwards means
nothing. If, however, he means by up increasing complexity,
then his statements bear a little more meaning. But is all change
in the direction of increasing complexity? Is increasing com-
plexity necessary to change before we may call it evolution,
or may we call any process of change evolution? These are
some of the questions which confront us, and which LeConte
does not answer.
When we study the earth's history we find, as we progress
through the Eozoic, Palaeozoic, Mesozoic, Genozoic and
Psychozoic periods, there an indication of a progression in
life from simple to complex. Since we admit that there have
been changes, we must also assume some process of change
which we may call progressive if by it we mean improvement—
improvement in adaptation. This is probably what LeConte
*Loc. cit., p. 9.
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meant. Evolution, then, is a process of change, each change
being an improvement in adaptation to the environment, and
resulting in an increase in complexity.
But this is not all evolution is. It is progressive change,
but also change "according to certain laws." What are these
laws? LeConte says: "I have been accustomed to formulate
them thus: a. The law of differentiation; b. The law of progress
of the whole; c. The law of cyclical movement."*
First let us consider the law of differentiation. Taking
again the type form of evolution the development of the
egg—first is the germ cell which as it divides and subdivides
forms the egg. As cell division continues different aggregates
of cells are set aside for different purposes: some form the
ectoderm germ-layer which later forms the nervous system;
others the entoderm layer from which is formed the nutritive
system; and still others the mesoderm from which the circulatory
system is formed. Thus there is an increasing differentiation
among the cells resulting in greater specialization. Also, in
the case of phylogenetic development, if we trace backward,
we find that the various specialized types merge to form one
branch, and the various branches one main trunk. "From
such a common trunk, by successive branching and rebranch-
ing, each branch taking a different direction, and all growing
wider and wider apart (differentiation), have been gradually
generated all the diversified forms which we see at the present
day. The last leafy ramifications—flower-bearing and fruit-
bearing—of this tree of life, are the fauna and flora of the
present epoch. The law might be called the law of ramifica-
tion, of specialization of the parts, and diversification of the
whole, "f
His second law is the law of progress of the whole. LeConte
assumes that there is a progress of the whole, but not neces-
sarily a progress of all the parts of that whole. He seems to
have a special idea of progress, namely, that progress is up—
the passing of something to something else which is higher.
He undoubtedly falls into this error by using the analogy of
the tree. He speaks of some cells as advancing '' to the dignity
of brain cells," while "other cells descend to the position of
kidney-cells." This seems to be a purely anatomical distinction
*Loc. cit., p. 11.
fLoc. cit., p. 13.
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of higher and lower, and unwarranted from the point of view of
development. What does he mean by the whole? Apparently
we may mark off any unity we desire and call it "the whole."
Thus within this whole are units each of which may be taken
as a whole necessarily in progress, and within each of these
other units and so ad infinitum. This being true there could
be no degeneration, if degeneration is the opposite of progress.
Thus, we are left in mid-air, so to speak, as to the meaning of
his second law. He does, however, make one statement which
may bring us on a more solid footing. "But here, also,"
he says inj speaking of the specialization of different cells for
various functions, "the highest cells are successively higher,
and the whole aggregate is- successively nobler and more com-
plex." The last two words are the significant ones, for if he
means by progress of the whole an increase in complexity,
then we have here the same element which we found in the
first part of his definition.
The last law is that of cyclical movement. Development
is not uniform but in cycles. Each wave or cycle rises higher
than the preceding one and then declines, and another wave
comes and mounts still higher. The molluscs of the Silurian
age dominated the earth, but they declined and gave place to
the fishes which rose above the molluscs because of their greater
complexity of structure and function. They too, however,
declined and today hold a lowly position because the reptiles,
mammals and man have successively reached points higher
and higher than that of the fishes. These, LeConte calls,
cycles of development. He applies this law to the develop-
ment of society where he thinks it is quite conspicuous. He
says:
"Society everywhere advances, not uniformly, but by successive
waves, each higher than the last; each urged by a new and higher
social force, and embodying a new and higher phase of civilization.
Again, as each phase declines, its characteristic social force is not lost,
but becomes incorporated into the next higher phase as a subordinate
principle, and thus the social organism as a whole becomes not only
higher and higher, but also more and more complex in the mutual
relations of its interacting social forces."*
This may be true, but it does not explain why social forces
come in waves, nor why each is higher than the last. To
*Loc. cit., p. 26.
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strike at the root of the matter we must know the meaning of
that vague term "social forces." To say that the development
of civilization happens thus and so does not explain it. We
ask further, Why does it happen thus and so? Thus instead
of finding a partial explanation in this law, we find it suggesting
further questions.
Now that we have these three laws in mind, let us pause a
moment and consider what LeConte means by the phrase,,
"according to certain laws." Of course, he is referring to the
three laws which we have just discussed above. The question
which arises, then, is, Do these three laws exhaust all the laws
of evolution? Apparently LeConte thinks so for he does not
mention any others. What, then, do we have thus far? The
second law— progress of the whole—we have found bears little
meaning; the third law—cyclical movement—is unimportant
and practically negligible, as he himself admits, and so we have
remaining only the law of differentiation, and "resident forces."1
This latter concept we shall now consider.
The third and important element of LeConte's definition
is, "that the forces or causes of evolution are natural; that
they reside in the thing developing and in the reacting environ-
ment."* The important thought, then, is that the forces are
natural and resident. This is true, LeConte says, of embryonic
development—the forces in the embryo are natural and they
are resident. Is this true of all evolution? First we must
see what he means by these two terms, "natural" and 'resi-
dent." In discussing these he says:
"Before stating the two opposite views of the cause of evolution, it is
necessary to remind the reader that when the evolutionist speaks of the
forces that determine progressive changes in organic forms as resident
or inherent, all that he means, or ought to mean, is that they are resident
in the same sense as all natural forces are resident; in the same sense that
the vital forces of the embryo are resident in the embryo, or that the
forces of the development of the solar system according to the nebular
or any other cosmogonic hypotheses are resident in that system. In
other words, they mean only that they are natural, not supernatural.
This does not, of course, touch that deeper, that deepest of all questions,
viz., the essential nature and origin of natural forces; how far they are
independent and self-existent, and how far they are only modes of
divine energy, "f
*Loc. cit., p. 28.
tLoc. cit., pp. 28-29.
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Thus we are to understand that "resident" and "natural"
forces are one and the same. From this quotation, we might
be led to believe that LeConte is presuming too much; but
when we turn to the third part of his book—The Relation of
Evolution to Religious Thought—we find a clearer statement of
Ms concept.
In discussing this point of natural law he says:
"It is the bringing together and complete reconciliation of the two
apparently antagonistic and mutually excluding views of direct agency
and natural law. Such reconciliation we have already seen is the true
test of a rational philosophy. It is the belief in a God not far away
beyond our reach, who once long ago enacted laws and created forces
which continue of themselves to run the machine we call Nature,
but a God immanent, a God resident in Nature, at all times and in all
places directing every event and determining every phenomena. . . . .
According to this.view the phenomena of Nature are naught else than
objectified modes of divine thought, the forces of Nature naught else
than different forms of one omnipresent divine energy or will, the laws
of Nature naught else than the regular modes of operation of that
divine will, invariable because He is unchangeable. According to this
view the law of gravitation is naught else than the mode of operation
of the divine energy in sustaining the cosmos—the divine method of
sustentation; the law of evolution naught else than the mode of
operation of the same divine energy in originating and developing the
cosmos—the divine method of creation; . . . . In a word, according
to this view, there is no real efficient force but spirit, and no real inde-
pendent existence but God."*
Thus God is immanent in Nature; He is the resident and
natural forces which account for evolution. Evolution is His
method of creation. Thus, when LeConte says, "by means of
resident forces," he means God, Divine Will or Vital Force.
To merely state that evolution is "due to resident forces"
adds nothing to the elucidation of the nature of the process of
development. Thus although LeConte's statement may be
perfectly true, it does not go far enough; it does not answer
our questions nor solve our difficulties. We wish to penetrate
further into the problem and discover, if possible, the nature
of these resident forces, why they are resident, and how they
have produced that which is in evidence.
Let us sum up LeConte's definition of evolution as we have
interpreted it. Evolution is change, in the direction of greater
complexity, and differentiation due to a Vital Force. This is
*Loc. cit., pp. 300-301.
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apparently all that we have left that is meaningful. Thus we
see that there is nothing expressed in this definition which was
not expressed by other thinkers before LeConte; he merely
brings some of these thoughts together to form one concept.
Change, we know was suggested by Heraclitus; the idea of
complexity we find in Lamarck, Darwin and the Neo-Darwin-
ians; differentiation was emphasized by Spencer, and Vital
Force or God is a religious concept which we find in the history
of evolutionary thought as early as Aristotle. Thus as we come
to the close of our discussion of LeConte's contribution to
evolutionary thought, we realize that it is rather significant
that he wrote at the close of the nineteenth century for he
epitomized the major ideas concerning evolution which were
presented by thinkers who came before him. LeConte sig-
nificantly marks the close of a long period in the history of
evolutionary thought.
